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With such a title, Dangerous Supplements 1 makes a calculated appeal to the 
reader's sense of intellectual adventure. It provokes the armchair adventurer 
with an urge not unlike the impulse that drives a skater farther out into a bay, 
beyond everyone else, to the point where, at the peril of failing to heed the 
darker shades of ice, a glance shoreward can reveal the unfamiliar in the 
familiar. 
The anthology's editor, Peter Fitzpatrick, plays with this conception from 
the outset. In his introduction, Fitzpatrick employs a metaphor that presents the 
study of contemporary critical theories of jurisprudence as voyages beyond the 
margins of convention. These confrontations are, however, intended to be 
intellectual sorties that encounter and assess the others; voices that challenge the 
status quo from beyond the limits it seeks to disavow. By their very existence, 
these others threaten the foundations of existing law. According to Fitzpatrick, 
the status quo has rallied with tactics that maintain hegemony through deft 
management of what are recognized as supplements that are dangerous to its 
body. "These voyages," he explains, "are never undertaken without the 
intention of returning more securely to the point of departure. Challenges from 
the surrounding context are thus either rejected or adjusted and absorbed."2 
Assimilation and rejection are the tactics that silence these subversive 
voices. Fitzpatrick's goal is, accordingly, to expose and reject these tactics, 
thus avoiding "the protective and premature closure around law which 
jurisprudence continually seeks to effect."3 In fact, more than that, he hopes to 
* Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. anticipated 1995. 
1 P. Fitzpatrick ed., Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991) [hereinafter Dangerous Supplements]. 
2 Ibid. at 1. 
3 Ibid. at 2. 
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prevent the closure that jurisprudence effects within itself. In attempting to 
replace appropriation with acknowledgement, he seeks to establish a dialectic 
that provides not only resistance, but also renewal to received authority. The 
result would supplant rejection with an uncertain, unsettled process of re-
formation; it is a conception that views the process itself not as the means to an 
end, but as the end of the means. The book explores new historicism, Marxism, 
neo-liberalism, feminism, semiotics and deconstruction in turn, and within one 
another. Jurisprudence, thereby, moves not only into the wider world of 
intellectual exploration, but also recognizes the full extent of its own landscape 
and, more importantly, acknowledges this process of recognition. 
The anthology presents widely divergent and often incompatible 
perspectives. The editor's introduction contains an extensive essay that 
illustrates how traditional jurisprudence manages the marginalization of 
emerging voices. Linguistic philosophy's tenuous entry into jurisprudence 
provides Fitzpatrick with an excellent subject from which to draw out his 
theories of rejection and assimilation, thus setting the stage for what is to follow. 
Subsequently, David Sugarman mobilizes historic contextualism to explore the 
forces that have shaped the development of jurisprudence. Progress has, more 
often than not, required the resolution of tensions between competing factions of 
educators. In these struggles, political agendas are shown to have often 
outweighed logic. The New Right and Marxism, presented in essays by Alan 
Thomson and Alan Hunt respectively, are the two subjects that follow. In both 
essays, these familiar perspectives are applied to disclose the inherently political 
in the supposedly value-neutral project of traditional jurisprudence. Carol 
Smart's essay on feminist jurisprudence leads into less familiar territory. She 
rejects previous constructive efforts in favour of achieving renewal from beyond 
the borders of traditional jurisprudence. The final two essays introduce 
semiotics and deconstruction. Unfortunately, both focus their attentions 
specifically on British institutions. These chapters, by Peter Goodrich and Yifat 
Hachamovitch, and Anthony Carty, are nonetheless worth exploring. 
The first essay, Fitzpatrick's, is a study of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of 
Law. Fitzpatrick views Hart's attempt to redefine positivist jurisprudence as the 
failed integration of mutually incompatible positions. Like jurisprudence in 
general, Hart appropriates the other (in this case the linguistic philosophy of 
Wittgenstein) and applies it selectively so that the conclusions remain confined. 
In this process, the otherness introduced by linguistic philosophy is ultimately 
denied. 
Fitzpatrick cites Wittgenstein's rejection of the concept of an externally 
observable, objective relationship between signifier and signified as the 
foundation of Hart's attempt to move beyond law's "siren call for definition, for 
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encapsulating what law is in some factual formula."4 Linguistic philosophy 
suggests conceptualizing an individual's comprehension of n,I!es as the product 
of the play between the external and internal elements. Moreover, this internal 
element fundamentally resists reduction. Reduction reforms by leaving 
something behind, so that any subsequent formulation shall be deficient. In a 
sense, the making of the formulation is its unmaking. 
Fitzpatrick supports Hart's conclusion that, by its nature, "the conception of 
law must include the idea of a rule."5 According to Fitzpatrick, however, this 
point marks Hart's departure from the strict conclusions of linguistic philosophy. 
Specifically, Hart attempts to reveal the foundations of law as a system of rules 
- a factual structure. This effort relies upon a reductive reformulation of the 
constituents. The very attempt conditions or determines the results. "As a 
linguistic philosopher," writes Fitzpatrick, "Hart would not seek the essence of 
law. He would not seek out what it is since for linguistic philosophy and for 
Hart that... was a misconceived quest. Yet it is a quest on which Hart now 
embarks. He bases the quest on the arbitrary and continuous reduction of law to 
rules."6 
Fitzpatrick's analysis of Hart's conception of the essence of law works to 
reveal the extent to which linguistic philosophy has been abandoned. He 
effectively undermines Hart's conclusions by exposing the ethnocentric 
foundations of his inquiry into law's social foundations. Revealing how the 
answers must depend upon who formulates the questions marks a return to 
linguistic philosophy. Fitzpatrick proves his point by introducing the 
supplement that persists outside of the work, and forcing Hart's conclusions to 
self-destruct. 
Undeniably, linguistic philosophy has provided Fitzpatrick with a powerful 
tool with which to attack Hart's conclusions. To this extent, the supplement has 
proven to be dangerous. Accompanying Fitzpatrick on his voyage, the reader 
has encountered an alternative reading of a text that undermines its fundamental 
conclusions. Fitzpatrick's essay serves well as an introduction to the anthology. 
The threat that linguistic philosophy presents to the integrity of Hart's text 
illustrates the greater danger which exists in the diverse voices that 
jurisprudence seeks to silence. Fitzpatrick concludes with a clear statement of 
purpose: "this volume is a collection of dangerous supplements. It explores the 
subversive implications of excluded knowledges for jurisprudence."7 There is, 
4 Ibid. at 6. 
5 Ibid. at 11. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. at 27. 
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however, an ironic difficulty that this statement overlooks. 
Meaning is imported to any message by the bearer who presents it. While 
the ideas behind the essays in Dangerous Supplements may be subversive, any 
serious threat from their otherness has been neutralized in their re-presentation, 
largely because accommodations are made to facilitate the presentation of the 
volume's contents. While Fitzpatrick recognizes the necessity of compromises, 
he persists in supposing that they are merely structural shortcomings, for 
example, limitations upon scope and depth of coverage. They are not, in his 
mind, inherently fatal to the project. The problem is that, in an anthology, it is 
inevitable that the dangerous nature of the supplement is left behind, at the 
margin, while a safer presentation is induced. The result is that the anthology's 
voyages are more akin to sightseeing than exploring. 
Dangerous Supplements is intended to be a vehicle for introducing the 
broad spectrum of work that has come to be collected under the heading 'critical 
theory' to the interested non-specialist. Any such effort is reductive in both 
scope and depth. Inevitably, the result is a strong reliance upon categorization 
and naming. These acts of containment mark a closure that is meant to facilitate 
introduction at the expense of the true nature of these others - the voices with 
which they speak are no longer their own. No anthology can attempt seriously 
to fully survey the many, diverse perspectives that comprise critical theory. 
Dangerous Supplements makes no claim to inclusivity. In fact, Fitzpatrick 
explains that the volume's contents have been kept to a minimum so that cost 
shall not discourage potential buyers. The inclusion of texts named as agents 
provocateurs from identified schools of criticism, however, unnaturally expands 
the scope of their individual responsibility. The result is a tension between the 
volume's ability to include, and its desire not to exclude. This effort to forestall 
closure only precipitates it. The voices within the text, burdened by the 
responsibility of presenting the voices without, often overreach themselves. A 
quick glance at some of the essays reveals not only these predictable 
weaknesses, but also some less predictable ones. 
Carol Smart' s "Feminist Jurisprudence" is plagued by one of the more 
predictable shortcomings inherent in this approach. "Feminist jurisprudence," 
she explains, "has not been taken seriously although .. .it poses a very real threat 
to the complacency of traditional jurisprudential thinking." 8 This threat, 
however, never really materializes in Smart's essay. Beginning with a 
thumbnail history of feminism, Smart arrives at a present that is reduced under 
four broad headings. This categorization, a conceptual aid for the reader, is an 
unfortunate compromise mandated by the nature of the anthology. The breadth 
8 Ibid. at 133. 
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of her subject is expansive and the underlying material suffers from this 
unnatural compression. 
According to Smart, previous efforts to construct a feminist jurisprudence 
have met with limited success. They are, she explains, predisposed to failure 
because of their confinement within the context of traditional jurisprudence: 
"feminist jurisprudence tends to be limited by the very paradigm it seeks to 
judge."9 Grounded in a body prone to acts of closure, projects to construct a 
feminist jurisprudence are, unavoidably, reductive and exclusive. They redefine 
rather than eliminate the marginalized. 
Smart seeks a solution that avoids this premature closure. In pursuit of this 
end, her conclusion remains open, an inquiry. "The question," she writes, "is 
whether feminist jurisprudence can overcome these conceptual and political 
problems or whether we need to start from somewhere else fundamentally to 
challenge the power of law and the heritage of traditional jurisprudence." 10 The 
efficacy of this approach is, however, limited in an essay that resorts to 
quartering the body of feminist jurisprudential projects. The essay's reductive 
conceptualization of feminist constructions is an act antithetical to S'mart's 
proposed openness. Juxtaposed against these constructions, Smart's open-ended 
conclusion does not appear to threaten traditional jurisprudence as much as it 
does feminist efforts to confront it. In distinguishing her perspective, Smart 
confronts and rejects her predecessor's constructions. The tension inherent in 
this constructed deconstruction undermines the potency of Smart's conclusion. 
Alan Thomson's chapter, "Taking the Right Seriously: The Case of F.A. 
Hayek," presents a very different critical voice with a very different, and 
unexpected, shortcoming. The subject of Thomson's inquiry has, he explains, 
suffered marginalization not because his values radically conflict with those of 
traditional jurisprudence, but rather, because of their similarity. Hayek' s overtly 
politicized inquiries produce results similar to those of the supposedly value-
neutral inquiries of traditional jurisprudence. Thomson portrays Hayek's 
exclusion from the mainstream as the product of traditional jurisprudence's 
struggle to ensure that its inherent biases remain concealed. 
Hayek's work is grounded in a deep skepticism of the power of reason. The 
positivist efforts of what he terms Constructivist Rationalism are, he believes, 
destined always to fail due to our specie's fundamental inability to predictably 
manipulate social order. Instead, Hayek favours a more modest approach which 
he terms Evolutionary Rationalism. This, Thomson explains, results from 
Hayek's deep respect for the mechanism of the market. Since his early exposure 
9 Ibid. at I 56. 
10 Ibid. 
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to economics, Hayek has always regarded the market as an instrument that was 
far greater than the sum of its parts. The best humanity can do is to recognize 
and adapt to market signals. Attempting to lead or overcome the market will 
only reduce its efficacy at our expense. 
Thomson clearly explains how Hayek's doubt attacks positivist 
jurisprudence by undermining the possibility of any universality grounded in 
reasoned inquiry. This skepticism, he explains, demands an inquiry into the true 
foundations of jurisprudence. Deprived of the facade of value-neutral reasoning, 
traditional jurisprudence must be seen as a politicized construction. Hayek's 
steadfast assertion that the market must prevail is an overtly political orientation. 
The problem for traditional jurisprudence is that Hayek's message applies to it 
as well. 
Disappointingly, Thomson concludes by dismissing his subject in favour of 
another approach. Having surveyed the most common criticisms of Hayek' s 
work, the author rejects not only Hayek but also the entire movement. The New 
Right, explains Thomson, silences the voices that proclaim the objective nature 
of human experience. Its concentration upon the subjective ignores the dualistic 
nature of human experience - of being both actors and acted upon. This denial 
is, however, accommodated by socialism. From this conclusion, Thomson 
swings across the political spectrum, abandoning neo-liberalism in favour of the 
left. Confusing as this abrupt change is in itself, Thomson proceeds to 
acknowledge that this alternative is itself fraught with serious weaknesses: 
"although socialism itself ... makes silencing claims to universal truth, it 
nevertheless in my view gives valid expression to another crucial aspect of our 
experience: our experience of ourselves as objects."II 
Thomson concludes by clearly favouring the voice from the left over the 
voice from the right. Regardless of the various arguments for and against these 
two approaches, Thomson's conclusion is no less than bizarre. His mandate was 
to introduce a marginalized voice and to undermine the forces that work against 
it. He carries out this project, however, only to conclude by asserting his own 
mode of rejection. In effect Thomson sends Hayek back to the margins from 
where he emerged. 
Whatever threat the anthology's underlying conceptions may constitute, 
their presentation is an accommodation that leaves what is dangerous on the 
outside. Fitzpatrick argues that the status quo assimilates or rejects the voices 
that challenge it from beyond. It is a mistake, however, to believe that 
anthologizing the supplements into a supplement does anything to undermine 
this process. Fitzpatrick relies upon Wittgenstein in this regard: "it can never be 
II Ibid. at 95. 
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our job to reduce anything to anything." 12 Although it facilitates the process of 
inquiry, the selection and compression of a diversity of perspectives into a thin 
volume is an accommodation of the status quo. The very manageability of the 
text undermines the danger of its contents. The anthology imports an unwanted 
harmlessness, even novelty, to its contents. In doing so it demonstrates all too 
clearly the insidious means by which the status quo appropriates from other 
voices for its own purpose. 
Dangerous Supplements serves adequately as a point from which to mount 
further explorations into areas that are emerging to challenge the traditional 
body of jurisprudence. As an effort to confront the assimilation and rejection of 
excluded voices, however, it fails due to the complicity inherent in its 
presentation. Fitzpatrick's metaphor holds inasmuch as the essays represent 
voyages to encounter other perspectives. As the texts advance to meet the 
reader, however, the perspectives alter. Ultimately, the voyager remains close to 
shore and on pretty thick ice. 
12 Ibid. at 16. 
